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Though W.E.H. Stanner’s essays ‘On Aboriginal Religion’ are a 
continuing—one may say without exaggeration, inexhaustible—
source of insight to students of Australian Aboriginal society (cf. Keen 
1986:26), they are not as widely known as their ethnographic and 
interpretive richness would seem to warrant, and regrettably, have not 
found a regular place in the cross-cultural study of religions. There 
are several reasons for this, some simple and some complex. This 
appreciation attempts to account for this relative neglect through a 
broad interpretation of Stanner’s aims and methods, and greater and 
lesser successes, in this work.
One reason that the work is not as well known as its appreciative 
readers might expect has been its limited availability as a monograph, 
something this edition is intended to rectify. The essays which comprise 
‘On Aboriginal Religion’ were originally published as a series of articles 
(spanning the years 1959–1963) in the journal Oceania (based at 
Sydney University). In 1963 they were reprinted, with the addition of 
a brief introduction by Stanner but otherwise unmodified, as Number 
11 in the Oceania Monographs series, in a limited edition. A second 
impression appeared in 1966. This too was soon exhausted, and editorial 
files reveal continuing inquiries about the monograph’s availability and 
possible reprinting. But Stanner himself, when contacted about this, 
was reluctant to allow its re-issue. The reason was, as his letters reveal, 
that he planned revisions of the work, though their intended nature 
and extent is not revealed in the correspondence. Some time after the 
possibility of a revised edition disappeared with Stanner’s death in 1981, 
Oceania sought Mrs. Stanner’s permission to re-issue the monograph 
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in order to gain for it the wider distribution it deserves, permission for 
which we here express our sincere gratitude.
Almost certainly, Stanner’s reluctance in the matter was linked to 
the fact that ‘On Aboriginal Religion’ was written as a series of articles, 
not conceived and written as a book. Thus while many of the ideas 
contained in the later articles are prefigured in the earlier ones, showing 
that from the first one Stanner had a conception of the linkages he 
wanted to make, nevertheless in refusing to allow re-issue it is likely 
that he had in mind a re-casting which would give a stronger unity 
to the whole. The work is ethnographically of a piece, in that all the 
material Stanner discusses comes from a single region, indeed in the 
main from one tribal grouping, the Murinbata, of the northwestern 
Northern Territory (see Barwick, Beckett and Reay 1985:4–8 [BBR] for 
background to Stanner’s fieldwork of the 1930s in this Daly River region). 
It is noticeable, however, that some of his main theoretical themes, such 
as his objections to interpretations of Aboriginal religion as reflecting 
the social order, recur throughout the essays, resulting in a degree of 
repetitiveness that his intended revisions might have eliminated. In 
the final essay, which contains some of Stanner’s broadest and most 
powerful constructions of an Aboriginal ontology, he observes (page 
325) that it should perhaps have been first rather than last, and that 
the first article, with its interpretation of an Aboriginal rite under the 
guise of sacrifice, might more appropriately have come last, so that (one 
infers) the aptness of the analogy could be felt to follow naturally from 
the preceding generalisations concerning the religion (see Maddock 
1985 for examination of the adequacy of the analogy, also comments on 
this by Keen 1986:42). To some extent, then, Stanner himself imposed 
limitations on the availability of the monograph because he still regarded 
it as a work-in-progress.
There are other, more complex reasons to explain why this work 
is not yet as well known as it should be. One, in my opinion, is an 
uncertainty or ambivalence in direction which developed over the 
course of writing of the essays. Thus certain themes broached in the 
earlier essays remain suggestive but unelaborated. Especially the first 
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three essays moot revisions in significant anthropological concepts, 
specifically, the development of a notion of a system or structure of 
operations over then-current notions of social structure (see below, 
also BBR 1985:33–34, Keen 1986 for further commentary). The reader 
presumes that Stanner will use the rich Murinbata ethnographic 
material to illustrate the utility and force of the proposed revisions. 
The later articles, however, evince no significant development of 
them through the material. Instead, alongside and partly through the 
comparative examination of Murinbata myth and rite, conducted by 
methods which do not significantly rely on, and in fact seem to by-pass, 
the intended development of a notion of operations, Stanner develops a 
rich and suggestive view of Aboriginal religion as an ontological system 
which, indeed, he had prefigured in the earlier articles as his main 
object of study (page 98, page 113). Thus, the development of the 
articles eventually reveals some lack of continuity between his earlier-
stated initiatives concerning anthropological theory, and the methods 
he actually applies in elaborating his portrayal of the ontology. Though 
there is a disjunction in the essays between the two emphases, they have 
an underlying point of contact in Stanner’s rejection of reductionist, 
impoverishing views of Aboriginal religion, varieties of which he claims 
are inherent in approaches to Aboriginal society through contemporary 
social structural analysis, and which he clearly intends his portrait of 
the ontology to redress.
One may object to focussing attention on Stanner’s discussion of 
such theoretical issues for, it may be argued, that turns out not to be 
the major emphasis or strength of the work. But that Stanner himself 
placed importance on his initiatives in this regard is shown by the fact 
that he devotes to them about half of the several pages he wrote in 1963 
as a brief Introduction to the monograph, when all the articles had been 
completed.
The following sections examine main themes in the work, leading 
up to Stanner’s conceptualisation of the Dreaming in the final article, 
the centrepiece of his exploration of Aboriginal ontology.
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Defects of Social Structural Analysis
Stanner’s studies at Sydney University, which out of necessity he 
combined with work as a reporter, took a decisive turn in 1929 when 
he enrolled for Anthropology I with A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, foundation 
professor at Sydney from 1926–1931 (see BBR 1985 for a detailed 
biography of Stanner, and a full bibliography of his work). Drawn by 
Radcliffe-Brown’s authoritative and winning style as teacher and mentor, 
Stanner graduated in 1931 with first class honours in anthropology, and 
soon undertook a seven month period of fieldwork in the Daly River 
region from 1932, one aim of which was to supplement Radcliffe-
Brown’s survey of ‘The social organisation of Australian tribes’ (1930–1).
While at the Daly, Stanner became aware of the impact of European 
intrusion on the Mulluk Mulluk, Madngella, Marithiel and Nangiomeri 
people with whom he worked, then mostly employed on peanut 
farms established in the Depression era here and elsewhere in the 
upper Northern Territory. This first-hand experience of the effects of 
colonisation, missionisation and usurpation kindled in him a continuing 
concern for the contemporary conditions of Aboriginal people, and 
prompted his increasing involvement over the years in policy and 
administrative developments, not only in Aboriginal affairs, but also in 
Africa and the Pacific, where he subsequently gained extensive field and 
administrative experience. There are, however, indications that in his 
fieldwork in the Daly he was most strongly drawn, intellectually and 
temperamentally, by insights into traditional religion and social life; 
and some of his later Aboriginalist writings (e.g. Stanner 1958) show 
a related tendency to explore even radical social transformation under 
the rubric ‘culture contact’ or ‘culture change’, with the attendant break 
between culture as a continuity of transmitted ‘values’ (cf. BBR 1985:31), 
and the actualities of social life, that such labels often entail.
Following completion in 1934 of his master’s thesis, ‘Culture Contact 
on the Daly River’, Stanner carried out another long stint of fieldwork in 
the Northern Territory, some of which formed the basis for his Doctoral 
thesis, ‘Economic Change in North Australian Tribes’, submitted at the 
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University of London in 1938. Early in his stay in England, Stanner 
briefly renewed his contact with Radcliffe-Brown, then at Oxford, and 
accepted his advice to write his thesis under Bronislaw Malinowski 
at the London School of Economics. Stanner found the intellectual 
environment there both taxing and stimulating (BBR 1985:9), and it 
certainly put him in touch with influences other than Radcliffe-Brown’s 
structural-functionalism, which he always acknowledged as formative 
(BBR 1985:4), but against which he registered a strong reaction in ‘On 
Aboriginal Religion’.1
Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism had of course partly 
been developed in relation to Australianist materials, but Stanner 
was obviously dissatisfied with it in general, and with its specific 
applications to Australian Aboriginal society. His own form of analysis 
of the Murinbata material owes little to it, and turns out to bear greater 
resemblance to Lévi-Strauss’ structural approach than to any form of 
sociological analysis (though Stanner notes that he was unaware of 
Lévi-Strauss’ work on myth until 1960, see page 325).
What defects, in Stanner’s view, inhere in the usual notions of social 
structure, and why are such notions inappropriate in relation to the 
Aboriginal material?
In a number of places Stanner makes it clear that, for him, the 
worst failing of social structural analysis is its aridity, its proceeding by 
reification and abstraction of social relations that have another nature 
(p. 16), resulting in models not of or after them, but about them. (We 
might now see this in light of Bourdieu’s 1977 theme of the limits of 
objectivism). Accordingly, modern anthropology is anxious that it is 
not yielding ‘clear pictures of human persons at the business of life’ (p. 
16).
Stanner repeats the image of social structural relations as enduring 
connections between points of force in a network (page 99 page 112, 
page 325, page 163), and he quotes Geddes’ definition to the effect 
1 See also Keen (1986:33–34) for indications of the positive influences of 
Firth on Stanner’s concepts of transaction and operation, discussed below, 
and some other aspects of Radcliffe-Brown’s influence.
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that it is ‘categories of people and the regular forms of relationship 
between them that anthropologists mean when they speak of social 
structure’ (page 113). In a passage which clearly alludes to (but does 
not mention) Radcliffe-Brown, Stanner says that social structural 
principles—the equivalence of alternate generations and the like—are 
inappropriately separated analytically from conduct as in some sense 
prior to it or causal of it. Rather, such so-called principles are ‘necessary 
and enabling conditions’ of social conduct (page 89), and insofar 
as they can be made concrete, are only known by their content, i.e. in 
conduct. Such principles do not yield a picture of sociality (page 113). 
What anthropology has become, Stanner complains, is a ‘dialogue over 
abstract nouns’, and ought to be converted into a ‘conjugation of verbs’ 
(page 63).
Were Radcliffe-Brown to have been confronted with these 
complaints, he probably would have regarded them as quite beside 
the point of constructing a ‘natural science of society’ (Radcliffe- 
Brown 1957, based on his University of Chicago lectures of 1937). The 
disagreement about what it is important and plausible to study would 
seem to be fundamental. Using an old figure to compare the views, we 
may say Radcliffe-Brown had in mind a comparative science of anatomy 
(despite his later moves towards a different formulation, see Radcliffe-
Brown 1952:4), while Stanner here argues that the prime object of study 
should be physiologies, the emphasis shifted more definitively from 
structure and function to process; and that the anatomical image is not 
even apt—structures may only be said to exist as functions (in a slightly 
different sense) of social acts, or operations, which are the only plausible 
object of ethnographic observation.2
2 Singer (1984) has argued that Radcliffe-Brown’s work shows a 
movement from early functionalist, empiricist and naturalist tendencies 
to moments of ‘genuine structural analysis’ later on (cf. Radcliffe-
Brown 1952, 1957), possibly influenced by conceptions of structure, 
and the philosophy of events and relations among them, of Russell and 
Whitehead. However this may be, it is clear that Stanner’s own view of 
Radcliffe-Brown’s principal contributions was that these lay in his efforts 
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Stanner says that operations are acts of sociality (page 113), and 
may be studied as having a distinguishable structure. Earlier (page 
89), he had broached a notion of transaction to capture the sidedness 
of human dealings, and had distinguished transitive and intransitive 
types of conduct (i.e. as to whether they have or are intended to have 
perceptible effect), in an effort to deal with the old question of whether 
it is appropriate to regard many types of religious acts as evidence of an 
‘illusion of technical competence’ (page 91), i.e. some sense of direct 
efficacy, on the part of those who participate in them.
How does Stanner envision the notion of operations or structure 
of operations contributing to an improved Australian Aboriginal 
anthropology? Its potential application is not made fully explicit, yet 
there are clear instances of his insight into the possibilities. Consider 
totemism, that hoary subject, which in Durkheim’s Elementary Forms, 
as well as works of lesser imaginative force, had been seen as the key 
to the description of Aboriginal society, as a segmental organisation of 
totemic clans. Besides deploring the reduction of Aboriginal religion 
to totemism (page 301, Stanner further contends that an image of 
segmental clans is a fundamentally inadequate view of Aboriginal 
sociality/society. It falsely tends to suggest that society can be seen as a 
unified whole (page 112), or rather, its organisation as unidimensional. 
He excoriates those (page 112)—no doubt he has W.L. Warner in mind, 
among others—who have thought to find in kinship a unifying principle 
which underlies interaction. There is not a social system which exhibits 
a structure. Totemism is an operational relation, which may indeed be 
seen as providing the fundamental mode of linkage between cosmology/
ontology and the social order. It provides the basis for men’s (sic) acting 
through totemic signs towards the putative ground of dependency 
(the ‘totemic endowment’), and in those actions reproducing types of 
to define types and forms of structure as that which is discoverable, 
coherent and consistent in social systems (albeit always acknowledged 
by Radcliffe-Brown to be virtual in what he distinguished as social 
organisation), and to develop a comparative social science based on the 
abstraction of such general features (see Stanner 1968).
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groupings and identifications ‘of a totemic determination’ (page 110). 
Thus, totemism constitutes an important ground of action, including 
the terms by which people act as a group, but only in relation to certain 
objects of activity, not all. Sociality, the ‘common life of interaction’ (page 
111), is composed of many different types of relation and activity—
marriage, trade, hunting, etc., which rest on diverse (‘conjugate’ page 
111) principles of association. No single one can be seen to organise all 
activities, nor do the various principles of organisation have a ‘ground 
of unity’ (page 111). Relations of association are ‘visible’ (page 111) 
as ‘conjoint acts’, and it is this structure of operations, Stanner proposes, 
that rightly constitutes the more concrete ‘matter’ in relation to which 
one may speak of a structure of functions, or regular forms of relations 
among (categories of) persons which, as in rite, sometimes presuppose 
a segmental structure. Thus, the totemic principle is relevant to certain 
types of social acts (e.g. the performance of rite, and perhaps to a lesser 
degree, many others), and any groups organised according to this 
principle can only be properly construed as complex functions of the 
activity types, not as one-dimensional, perduring, organ-like structures 
constituting society (see Sansom 1980 for recent development and 
ethnographic application to Aboriginal material of ideas which bear 
some similarities to these). It is not that Aboriginal sociality/society has 
no form, but it is the forms and objects of action that are primary, rather 
than categories and groups, which are to be seen as functions of action.
It is not clear how far Stanner would have thought it appropriate to 
generalise this view to other societies. In any event, from this interesting 
beginning Stanner’s use of the term ‘operations’ becomes scarcer, 
and especially in the later analyses of myth and rite it gives ways to 
a profusion of other terms—event (page 129), incident (page 212), 
parallel structures of rite and myth (page 212), sequences of conduct, 
process, forms of process (page 114)—to which he no doubt wants 
to relate it, but without ever explicitly doing so. In short, ‘operation’ 
drops out as an analytical category as the examination of myth and 
rite deepens, and the reader becomes aware that what Stanner wants 
to say about these forms here—what they reveal about the ‘ontology 
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of a type of thought and life’ (page 98)—does not depend upon its 
clarification.3
Before we leave this subject we may note one peculiarity in Stanner’s 
intended concept of operations which, I think, does owe something to 
Radcliffe-Brownian naturalist and empiricist influence.
Stanner writes that ‘one may actually see the constituent operations’ 
of the rite of Punj (page 99); also, that there occur ‘things which I have 
seen and could have been seen by anyone’; further on (page 166) he 
refers to operations as ‘manual acts’. The sum of such characterisations 
(see also BBR 1985:31, Keen 1986:41) leaves little doubt that Stanner 
was searching for a perceptually-based, empirical point of departure 
which could be claimed to be at least as real as in the most realist view 
of social structure. If the matter had been put directly to him, I do not 
believe Stanner ultimately would have adhered to the view that there is 
any simple relation between observation—‘things I have seen’—and the 
interpretation of them as particular kinds of social acts. Nevertheless 
there is a distinct positivist impulse here, a tendency to want to develop 
theoretical concepts of the same putative order of reality as social action 
appears to its participants/observers to be.
But in any case, as we shall see, Stanner’s analysis is not principally 
directed to real time social acts as these can be observed, but rather to 
segmentations of rite and myth, and correlations between them, that 
contribute to his main theme, the interpretation of Aboriginal ontology.
What Is Aboriginal Religion?
Stanner is duly cautious about the possibility of defining Aboriginal 
(or any) religion (page 63). Beyond this, however, it is of interest 
to consider briefly how he uses the term, for it is nowadays widely 
3 See also Keen (1986:41) for a related critique, that the ‘lack of an 
adequate theory of action’ is the main defect in Stanner’s approach to the 
analysis of religion in social life.
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thought that Aboriginal life is in some way suffused with spirituality 
or religiosity, a generalisation with which I think Stanner would agree, 
and which, in considerable measure, his writing has probably helped to 
establish.
Above, we have already discussed Stanner’s objection to 
reductionist/reflectionist views of Aboriginal religion as a ‘dependent 
variable’ (page 62), a mere secondary reflection of a primary social 
order (page 99). In his view, many discussions of totemism have been 
basically flawed for this reason.
Stanner also deplores views that Aborigines have nothing worthy 
of the name ‘religion’, or—to re-cast this in a way that illustrates the 
sort of conditions he places on such an identification—that they were 
a primitive people who ‘could not possibly have had serious thoughts 
about life’ (page 320). That Aborigines have something worthy of 
being called ‘religion’ would now certainly be accepted by many, not 
only because of a general feeling (which, as we have noted, Stanner 
shared) that to attempt to rigorously define it is futile, but also partly 
because not all would associate with its definition the high criterion of 
moral insight (he often softens this to ‘intuition concerning men’s life 
and condition’, page 299) that Stanner does.
Stanner says he uses ‘religion’ indicatively, to point to ‘the content 
of a devotional life’ (page 62). In the second article (page 96) he 
diagrams his view of the partition of reality according to an Aboriginal 
scheme. There, things he defines as of the order of religion only represent 
a portion of the lived order, overlapping with, but of lesser extent than, 
things of the social order. Insofar as social and religious orders can 
be distinguished in this way, Stanner views the social as providing a 
language of ‘shapes’ (page 133) through which religious reality is 
expressed (see also page 301on the importance of distinguishing 
between the nature of symbols and the ‘things of ultimate religious 
concern’ for which they stand). All experience is encompassed within 
the ontology of the Dreaming.
The character of the devotional life is sacramentalist; that is, 
men act through signs which, he asserts, betoken dependency on 
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an endowment and flow of benefits (totemic in character), and such 
actions are performed also under a plan for distributing the flow of 
benefits among men. Thus, Stanner defines the main parts of what he 
terms the religious economy (page 100) as: the totemic endowment 
with its flow of life-benefits; the exchange of signs (in rite); and the plan 
of distributing the flow among men (social institutions). Though the 
entire religious economy is set within and suffused with the ontology 
of the Dreaming, the focus, or high points, of the religion are the 
rites in which signs of the endowment (e.g. sacred objects such as the 
bullroarer, sacred designs, etc.) are manipulated and exchanged. In the 
initiatory rites discussed in the first article, for example, it is shown that 
there is a passing on of rightful knowledge of the efficacious signs from 
seniors to juniors, initiators to initiands, conceived as a conferring of 
understanding and adulthood.
Not all socially significant acts are sacramental; that is, not all involve 
devotional use of signs of the endowment. Stanner notes, for instance, 
that ‘neither birth nor marriage attracts rites and ceremonies of a 
sacramental kind’, so that these occasions, in his sense, are not treated as 
‘religiously significant’ (page 103). Thus, though all religious practice 
and, in theory, all the instituted forms of life are encompassed within 
the foundational Dreaming, not all of social life is, in his definition, 
religious in character.
In his discussions of rite throughout the essays, Stanner describes 
the ‘exchange of signs’ and, as well, there is discussion of aspects of the 
‘distribution of the flow’ among men (see e.g. page 298 a reference 
to a ‘ruling stratum’ of older men, and to the ascendancy of men over 
women). His portrayal of the distribution, however, tends overall to be 
a-political in character: though he observes (page 321) that ‘political 
force was used to impose and maintain’ received tradition, his broader 
assumption is that because there was a ‘notion of an original endowment 
of each clan with the means of life’, their relation in the religious rites 
could only be one of support, not of competition: ‘There could be no 
struggle for a division of what had already been divided’ (page 323). 
He concedes the possibility of individuals acting to maximise their own 
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interests, but sees this as a perversion by which the religion itself should 
not be judged.
Finally, Stanner explores the totemic endowment partly through 
discussion of what he calls ‘existence classes’, that in linguistic 
description (Walsh 1976) are called ‘noun classes’. Stanner, however, 
would not be happy with this narrower view of them as grammatical 
phenomena, the nature of whose relation to conception is more or less 
indirect. He describes the classes as ‘ontological conceptions’ which 
‘divide all significant matter in the world into classes’ (page 170), so 
that the ‘very language through which the more mundane things of life 
are dealt with is itself dense with symbolical import’ (although he adds, 
in a way that distinctly lessens the impact of such an assertion, ‘it may 
be somewhat indeterminate’). The claim that these classes are imbued 
with significances relating to the constitutive patterns of the Dreaming 
goes, I believe, well beyond anything he is able to establish. But it is 
also his claim, here (page 177) and elsewhere, that symbolisation in 
the medium of language is not privileged in the practice of Aboriginal 
religion. With that, let us turn to consider the senses in which Stanner’s 
approach is, and is not, concerned with issues of symbolic analysis.
Symbolisation in Aboriginal Religion
A large part of Aboriginal religion, Stanner remarks, is focussed upon 
‘the rightful possession and dutiful use of the efficacious signs’ (page 
85). But with some exceptions (see e.g. comments on the significance 
of human hair, page 251) Stanner does not embark on a minute anal-
ysis of the detailed sign elements of rite and myth (though there are 
extensive reports of the contents of both, especially in essays IV and 
V). His reason for not focussing closely on the symbolisms is perhaps 
best summarised in his remark that he thought it more important to 
‘study the symbolised rather than the symbols’ (page 308). His general 
view of the relation between social phenomena and religious expres-
sion, a form of problem inherited from Durkheim but in some ways 
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an inversion of Durkheim’s reflectionist proposition that religion is a 
projection of the form of society, is that rite and myth present people 
with images of the unknown and mysterious in the terms of the ‘known 
and non-mysterious—the social order’ (page 135). Thus, for Stanner, 
the ultimate objects of religion lie beyond the social order: ‘The society 
was not the real source and object of the religion’ (page 300). And in 
any case, considerable difficulties stood in the way of pursuing the study 
of the meaning of the religion through the elicitation of close comment 
from the Murinbata.
Stanner describes the difficulty of eliciting exegesis of meanings 
from informants, and concludes that there is a general attitude of 
‘uninquiring acceptance’ (page 150) of things that would appear to be 
symbolic in character, standing for something beyond themselves. The 
religion involves expression in diverse media, and all present difficulties 
in this regard. Song words are often obscure (page 156). The meaning of 
spatial motifs of rite, as well as the denotation of many visual signs, often 
cannot be successfully probed by direct inquiry (page 156). People will 
make some comments on myth, but beyond these ‘The usefulness of 
both direct and indirect questions falls off sharply’ (page 123). A lack 
of explicit teaching is also typical of those aspects of the secret-sacred 
Karwadi ceremony which have to do with the initiation of young men 
(page 92). Discursive (i.e. explicit, indigenously made and recognised 
meanings) do not predominate, while in the brilliant use of music, song, 
mime and dance, presentational symbolisms—indeterminate in sense 
and reference, but still powerful vehicles of effect—abound (see page 
168 for Stanner’s application of this distinction, developed by Susanne 
Langer). If understanding of rite and myth is to pass the threshold of 
resistance to interpretation, ‘then it must be by other means’ (page 
151) than the usual forms of inquiry. Ultimately any inquiry about 
rite, myth and things of religious significance results in comment from 
Aborigines that they are done to ‘follow up the Dreaming’. There is an 
adherence to things and patterns laid down, but obscurity pervades 
inquiry into them, and Stanner senses that mystery is an important part 
of Aboriginal feeling for them.
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Stanner warns us we should not, on account of the obscurity, 
make the old mistake of thinking that Aboriginal religion is ‘lifeless 
adhesion to a deadened routine’ (page 150). For participants there is 
‘rapt absorption in things that have emotional appeal and give aesthetic 
pleasure’ (page 149). In Stanner’s view, the simple Durkheimian sacred-
profane dichotomy is inadequate to yield understanding of the complex 
and ‘crescive’ (page 313, i.e. cumulative and overlaid) symbolisms. 
What form of analysis can yield some understanding?
In relation to the multi-media expression of Aboriginal religion, 
and even to different tokens of the same type of medium (e.g. different 
myths), Stanner develops a notion of ‘congruent symbolising’:
Act, myth and spatial forms belong to distinct orders. We are 
thus not discovering the same phenomenon under different 
names. What we find by analysis is a set of congruences 
between components of a whole which are expressed 
according to the technique and system appropriate to each 
mode of symbolizing (page 168).
He summarises the congruence among forms of religious expression 
even more pithily, thus:
It is one of analogous elements arranged with similarity of 
form or pattern and having a commonness of import mani-
fest in different types of symbolism (page 181).
What is that whole of which the various types of expression are 
components; what is the commonness of import into which religious 
expression permits a view? Stanner tells us that the religion expresses 
the insight of a complex sense of people’s ‘dependence on a ground and 
source beyond themselves’, a sense inherently of ‘good-with-suffering’, 
‘order-with-tragedy’ (page 165), a ‘fatal impairment’ (page 323) from 
the beginning, and thus subjection to the ‘joint imperium of the good 
and the bad’ (page 147); and that this insight is considerable (though 
it is his opinion that the intuition of moral freedom or perfectibility 
is an even greater one, page 145); and that in the religion the insight 
is expressed with a ‘certain nobility that transcends the strange 
symbolisms’ (page 147). Thus:
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The symbolistical activities do not manipulate objects of life 
but express the valuations placed on them, and the desires 
for them (page 92).
The Method: Congruence of Myth and Rite
Confronted by the difficulties, already sketched, of gaining indigenous 
exegesis, Stanner remarks that many anthropologists might feel that 
they must transpose the study to phenomena of the unconscious mind 
(page 151). But in a dismissal perhaps typical then of those of British 
social anthropological background, Stanner tends to see such a psycho-
logical approach as mutually exclusive with an anthropological one:
...the symbolisms are constituents of collective acts of 
mutuality, with a logical structure, a detectable range of 
meanings, and an aesthetic appeal as well as a premial place 
in the social development of individuals. These relations may 
be appropriately studied by the methods of anthropology 
(page 151).
In the first article Stanner discusses the ceremony of Punj or Karwadi, 
in II the associated myth, in IV and V the myth of the Rainbow Serpent 
or Kunmanggur, the rite of male initiation, mortuary rite, and the myth 
of Kukpi, the Black Snake-Woman. Important to Stanner’s mode of 
analysis is that in only some cases are a rite and a myth presently linked: 
the rite of Karwadi and the myth of Mutjingga, the Old Woman, form 
such a clearly associated pair. In other instances we have ‘riteless myths’ 
(i.e. myths, even apparently great and portentous ones such as that of 
the Rainbow Serpent, which are not associated with rite), and ‘mythless 
rites’ (e.g. male puberty rites).
The problem of the relation between rite and myth was of long 
standing in the study of religion. Stanner was obviously influenced 
by Robertson Smith, who saw rite as fundamental and myth as a 
secondary development in relation to it. Yet Stanner was not wholly 
satisfied with this view. Despite a measure of disbelief (page 185) that 
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an important myth such as that of the Rainbow Serpent should never 
have been associated with any known rite (he cites in partial support 
of his incredulity the apparent association of the myth with two major 
rock art sites in the region), Stanner is inclined to give definitive priority 
to neither form. (He does, however, later suggest that myth may have 
a longer life than cult, page 304). Rather one may, with due caution, 
adopt the method of looking:
within presently dissociated myths for the structural forms 
that would enable them to be compared with myths still 
demonstrably connected with rites, and to elicit from myths 
of both classes their kerygmatic elements—the statements of 
abiding truths about life—for comparison (page 186).
For Stanner has no doubt that:
Each myth has something to say—something significant, said 
beautifully and tragically—about the first and last formula of 
things, the ultimate conditions of human being, the instituted 
ways in which all things exist, and the continuity between the 
primal instituting and the experiential here-and-now (page 
186).
And there is evidence of improvisation, innovation, vitality, in 
religious tradition. The Aborigines are not, as T.G.H. Strehlow (1971) 
would have had it, decadent in a social-evolutionary sense, a people in 
decline living off the spiritual capital of the past (page 189).
Having segmented and compared the various forms of myth and 
rite—rite and myth together, mythless rite and riteless myth—Stanner is 
willing to take an interpretive ‘leap in the dark’ (page 210) to hypothesise: 
there is a congruence of structure among all of them. The reader must 
examine the divisions into phases, and the posited structural parallels 
among myth and rite forms (e.g. page 212) to determine whether the 
segmentations, and the alleged parallels, seem apt; Stanner makes no 
effort to justify them closely. That he senses possible difficulty here is 
shown by an early comment that, when it is ontology that is under study, 
‘some degree of implicit valuation’ is unavoidable (page 96); and a 
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later one, that there is the ‘problem of reducing the impressionism of 
the approach’ since the materials ‘transcend controlled methods’ (page 
273). But he asserts that it is a methodological improvement over the 
social structural analysis he criticises because it ‘arranges for further 
study the empirical similarities’ rather than postulating holism (page 
268).
At some level of abstraction from the actual narrative content 
Stanner proposes that all the forms show a common design with this 
patterning of content:
Someone is sent or withdraws from a safe, habited place to a 
place of solitude. In the second place—the place of removal, 
or in the place deserted—wildness or terror, and a sort of 
corruption, become ascendant. Something—trust, young 
life, innocence—is destroyed there. Then, after a pause, there 
is a return to the first place. But it is now not the same as 
before; there has been a change; the old is not quite annulled 
and the new not altogether unfamiliar (page 224).
And at an even higher level of abstraction, Stanner finds that all 
exhibit the formula, very similar to the van Gennepian one: there is 
a setting aside, a withdrawal, a transformation and a changed return 
(page 268). All rites and myths may be seen as varying ‘material 
manifestations’ of the structure (page 269).
What are the meanings of such a structure? Though Stanner makes 
some observations concerning this in a number of places (see e.g. on 
the one hand, his noting the demands made upon young males, page 
224; and on the other, the emphasis upon transience within forms of 
permanence), it is really in the final essay, subtitled ‘Cosmos and Society 
Made Correlative’, that he makes a sustained effort to put together a 
portrait of the ontology of which this structure is part, and the limits of 
the kind of meaning he attributes to it become clear.
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The Dreaming
According to the ontology as Stanner interprets it, all that exists does 
so in terms fixed ‘once-for-all’ (page 296) by the acts of mythic cre-
ator figures in an ‘everywhen’ time/event dimension (Stanner 1965). 
(This dimension has come to be called the Dreaming, following some 
Aboriginal usage, both in English and some indigenous languages; and 
the mythic figures themselves are called ‘dreamings’ by Aborigines in 
many parts of the continent). Existing things belong to types estab-
lished by the founding creative dramas, and also persons and places are 
linked to and defined by their relations to those mythic events, relations 
expressed largely in an idiom of totems, forces which continue to be 
immanent in the landscape which they created. In the terms of these 
concepts, the very existence of things is proof of their links to the found-
ing creative acts: what is, is true (page 308) and bears witness to those 
acts, in which things simultaneously became determinate and endowed 
with meaning. There was instituted a pattern of relevances and a moral 
order ‘such that the totality of life was a cosmological structure’ (page 
297). Not only the ‘structures and process of life were settled’ by the 
founding creative dramas, but ‘man’s whole lot, including the possibil-
ities of his life’ (page 302). Besides the ‘archaist outlook’, ‘reactionary 
temper’ and ‘conservative impulse’ associated with such a determinis-
tic conception in general, in Aboriginal society older men in particular 
comprised a ‘ruling stratum’ who ‘enforced a general assent to the terms 
of life which they... had adopted at pain and cost’ (page 298).
Throughout the essays Stanner finds evidence in myth of a dominant 
theme of ‘immemorial misdirection’ (page 118), or ‘irreparable injury 
to man at the beginning of life under instituted forms’ (page 319), 
exemplified by the cruel treatment of youth entrusted to the care of the 
Old Woman of the myth associated with the rite of Punj or Karwadi.
The major rites simulate the events of the founding dramas and 
thus are symbolic affirmations (page 299) of them:
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Each ritual occasion vivified in the minds of celebrants 
the first instituting of the culture, deepened the sense 
of continuity with man’s beginnings, and reaffirmed the 
structures of existence (page 298).
The rites dramatise and make manifest the possibility of assent 
to the instituted conditions of life, despite its inalterable element of 
tragedy:
The myths are evidence that they reflected and felt a fatal 
impairment, but the rites are evidence that they met the 
issue in a positive way. They brought the inexorable within 
the total economy of living and put positive values upon it, 
so as to integrate it with social actuality and actuality’s values 
(page 323).
During the founding dramas, two domains of life became 
distinguishable but remained interdependent: the corporeal and 
incorporeal (page 298).
The principle of the religion was to make fleshly, determinate 
and social life correlative with the spiritual cycle (page 317).
A human life as spirit was subject to movement along an inexorable 
course at the same time that ‘it had to be given value and status 
appropriate to progressively developing functions of its worldly life’ 
(page 318). The segmentation of the spiritual course was not entirely 
fixed and underwent historical change, and as part of this process there 
occurred changes in the allocation of social value. The possibility of 
developmental change in Murinbata religion is an important theme 
mentioned in several of the essays, and below we return briefly to 
Stanner’s ideas about the evidence that myth and rite provide for it.
As a result of the conjoint, social-spiritual definition of necessity 
within the scheme of once-for-all foundation, the ‘person himself was 
treated as helpless’ (page 318), required to surrender to imperatives 
dramatised and embodied in the symbolisms already sketched, of 
removal from human fellowship, transformation, and restoration, 
accompanied at each stage by the removal of social value, status and 
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functions, their destruction, and the conferring of enhanced value, 
status and functions (page 318).Throughout these essays Stanner 
argues against views of Aboriginal social life as static, and of the religious 
practice as adherence to a lifeless routine. But his writing distinguished 
from this, and brought into focus, Aboriginal valuation of continuity 
and the imposition upon events of an image of persistence ‘as the main 
character of reality’ (page 321). In the final essay he suggests some 
sources of change in Murinbata religious tradition that were compatible 
with the forms of permanence of the established ritual life. These are 
revaluations at two loci in the rites which make and keep correlative 
the corporeal and incorporeal domains: first, change in the relation 
between ‘life-situations’ (page 317, stages of human development) and 
their ritual recognition; and second, change in the recognised value of 
ritual transformation (and ultimately, in keeping with this, changes in 
the valuation of particular kinds of rite with respect to each other). In 
relation to the first point, Stanner cites the preeminence of admission 
to the rite of Punj over, for example, circumcision: the latter is said to 
simply confer adulthood or, in the Aboriginal expression, to ‘make 
men’, while the former is more highly valued in that it is meant and 
said to make men understand (page 103). Stanner sees the higher 
valuation of understanding over the attainment of manhood/adulthood 
through initiation as the last major historical development in rite before 
European influence set in (page 317). He sees as a possible kind of 
change the valuation as of ritual significance of birth and perhaps 
other life-situations, but he finds there is no evidence of this. There 
is some direct evidence of changes in Murinbata ritual tradition (see 
e.g. mention of the obsolescence of formerly great rites, page 141), 
yet there also appears to be considerable historical persistence of ritual 
form. Partly on the basis of the evidence of changes, Stanner returns 
to the problem of what is to be made of the existence of great myths 
dissociated from rite, and of rites without myths. Suggesting that 
perhaps the true function of such myth is to rationalise the exalting of 
things to the status of cult objects, he concludes with an hypothesis of 
the historical relation of myth and rite, namely that myths not attached 
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to any recent or extant rite are ‘memorials of old formations of cult’ 
(page 304). As undemonstrable as this may be from the Aboriginal 
material, it is part of Stanner’s continuing preoccupation with what 
he was able to distil and make sensible to others as a crucial feature 
of Murinbata orientation to lived experience, namely, the constant 
working to assimilate change to the instituted forms of permanence. He 
saw this as possible within terms of life encompassed by the Dreaming.
The Contribution of ‘On Aboriginal Religion’
Not in sympathy with structural-functionalist attempts to define soci-
ety, Stanner was more interested in the tenor of sociality—which, as 
Radcliffe-Brown noted, is not any kind of entity (page 115)—and, 
incipiently, in what we might now call socio-cultural constructions of 
meaning. But he had chosen to work with a people for whom discourse 
about significance was not a typical or preferred mode, except at levels 
so abstract (e.g. the rite of Punj is done so that men will understand) 
that they seemed to provide little analytic leverage.
From a slightly different angle, Stanner deplored the treatment of 
Aboriginal religion as something else—as totemism, and in particular, 
as an epiphenomenon of the nature and form of society. It was his 
prime conviction that ‘The first duty of anthropology in dealing 
with Aboriginal religion is to try to elicit the kind of reality the facts 
of study have for the people responsible for them’ (page 95). But 
secondly, he ordained the sort of reality this must be: ‘natural facts of 
human conviction about the ultimates of life’ (ibid). Hence the tone of 
profundity and moralism that pervades ‘On Aboriginal Religion’, some 
would say giving it a distinctively Stannerian rather than recognisably 
Aboriginal tone, and hence also the degree of divorce in the work of 
religion from social structure, upon which Keen (1986) and Morphy 
(1988:243) have both commented.
Despite the weaknesses this divorce introduces into the work, 
Stanner’s insistence that religious reality must be of that lofty nature 
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enabled him to accomplish something with his Murinbata materials 
that no previous study of Aboriginal rite and myth had, and that few 
have since. Leaving behind any framework which would merely assign 
trivialising functions, or uni-dimensional structure, to the religious 
order, he pioneered a way of placing the study of ‘religion’ into broader 
interpretive study of Aboriginal life. He sought to identify through 
religious expression the encompassing dimensions of what he called the 
‘ontology’, and by this route succeeded in formulating propositionally 
many of the overt attitudes and less explicit orientations towards 
lived experience with which many subsequent attempts to describe 
Aboriginal ways of life resonate profoundly: faithful belief in the fixed 
once-for-all foundation of the lived-in world, but yet the absorption of 
transience within these forms of permanence, and others.
How did this mark a watershed? Aboriginal ‘data’ always had 
an extremely important place in the development of sociological-
anthropological theory. But many of the early theoretical uses of 
Aboriginalist material relied upon the particular kinds of evidence 
gathered by such avid collectors as Spencer and Gillen. Their descriptions 
of the rites—the Intichiuma, the Wollonqua, and many others—assumed 
the cardinal institution of totemism, its familiarity and naturalness as 
an object of study in ‘primitive’ society. However, one reads dozens 
of pages of these accounts with the growing realisation that there is 
little there of ‘the kind of reality the facts of study have for the people 
responsible for them’. Wading through the detailed descriptions of rite 
is like restricting one’s observations of foreign cuisine to the preparation 
of an elaborate meal of many and strange ingredients: enough can be 
assumed so one thinks one knows what is going on, but at the end, one 
must acknowledge that the dish remains unpalatably odd, and one has 
gained little grasp of the overall occasion at which it is to be eaten.
As Malinowski did for the Trobrianders, subsequent major 
descriptivist accounts of Aboriginal religion (see e.g. Elkin 1964) tended 
in one way or another to urge that, despite the strange symbolisms, 
the rites were socially ‘functional’, the orientations and motives 
of individuals understandable, and some of the social institutions 
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functionally comparable to our own. But such assurances always come 
from a perspective that remains unremittingly external to what is 
under study. Stanner, instead, made ‘sense’ of the Murinbata material, 
and recognising significant Aboriginal commonalities, through it also 
indicated possibilities for understanding of Aboriginalist material 
more broadly, by developing it in relation to a cosmology, which he 
described solemnly and even reverently. Of the recognition of his 
achievement, Morphy (1988:243) has recently written: ‘Hiatt (1975:11) 
was undoubtedly right when he wrote that: ‘There would be a wide 
agreement among Australianists that [Stanner’s] Oceania Monograph 
‘On Aboriginal Religion’ is the most sensitive analysis of the subject 
to have appeared’. Morphy adds, however, that the work has been little 
cited and only recently the subject of critical review (in Keen 1986). 
This leads us to try to spell out how a thoroughgoing sociological 
insufficiency appears in the work as the negative side of Stanner’s effort 
to transcend a reductionist structural-functionalism.
Stanner reacted against the limitations of structural-functionalism 
against the background, which he shared with Radcliffe-Brown, of 
a pervasive Durkheimian influence (see Stanner’s 1967 critique of 
Durkheim). Stanner attempts to transcend Durkheim’s conclusion that 
the most elementary form of religion is a projection and celebration 
of the segmental form of society, contending instead that the objects 
of Aboriginal religion, of myth and rite, are things of ultimate 
concern. Society is not its object; instead, the religion provides the 
nearest approach to the encompassing ‘ontology’, which is the basis of 
Aboriginal reality. Religious rites are ‘acts towards whole reality, myths 
are allegorical statements about it, and social customs are acts within 
whole reality’ (page 98).
Stanner’s formulation, while seemingly opposite to the Durkheimian 
original, remains fundamentally of the same kind as Durkheim’s in their 
shared representationism, that is, in the claim that complex practices 
encompassed in the term ‘religion’ may be understood as being about 
some more or less easily defined object. As we have seen, in Stanner’s 
view the religion is about a founding ‘paradox, antinomy or dualism 
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common to all the structures of existence’ (page 319), of which myths 
are allegories, and to which rites are a positive response. For Stanner, 
instead of closely reflecting society’s form, ‘the religion appeared as the 
society’s completion’ (page 319), the mysteries and irreparable injury 
of the human condition ‘adumbrated by means of symbolisms couched 
in familiar idioms’ (page 299).
Thus Stanner shaped the terms of debate inherited from Durkheim 
as an opposition between the determination of religion by society, or 
the transcendental character of religion in relation to society. This was 
certainly not a matter to him of pure theory, but given earlier extended 
debate on the nature of totemism and primitive religion, he construed 
it also as an ethical and philosophical issue of the worth to be accorded 
to Aboriginal life and culture generally. It is because he constructed 
the issue, with moral overtones, as one of whether Aboriginal religion 
is greater or lesser than society, and answered it resoundingly in the 
former way, that he did not develop themes, for which much material 
is present in his text, of the religion as complex social phenomenon. 
Stanner’s representationism, a curious form of reduction given the 
vastness of what religion is about (‘things of ultimate concern’), gives 
to his characterisation of the religion an intellectualising, contemplative 
quality (cf. Keen 1986:44), as if its practices were essentially signifying 
ones, conveying some importance or consequence of which they are 
the mere expression. But it is a credit to Stanner as ethnographer the 
extent to which material that would be needed to develop other themes 
is suggestively present in the work, as Hiatt’s following Introduction 
also attests.
We may now return to the earlier statement that the reasons for which 
this work is not more widely known are complex. Though Stanner had 
criticisms to make of notions of social structure, he did not refine any 
alternative concepts through the Murinbata material, and in that sense 
leaves one major initiative in the work unrealised. But though his major 
concern is to elucidate Aboriginal religion, he achieves something of far 
wider anthropological significance in his suggestion of what he called 
the ‘sacramentalist’ religion, with its associated human and cosmic 
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relations, as part of a particular form of life which he depicts in part. 
Because Stanner makes no concession to simple notions of function, 
and rejects outright simplifying notions of structure, the definition of 
the religion, and the human-cosmic forms of relations associated with 
it, cannot be stated formulaically as an easily repeatable, single ‘idea’ (cf. 
Morphy 1988:243); and so the work falls foul of the canon that what is 
to be perceived as widely applicable must be simple and crystalline. But 
in the attempt to characterise the interpenetration—rather than simple 
functional or structural relation—of the religion with other aspects of 
the form of life, lie multiple strands of connection which Stanner chose 
not to explore, which however are suggestive not only for students 
of Aboriginal social life in particular, but also for those many more 
concerned with developing better understanding of the social grounds 
of religious phenomena in general.
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